Pakistan’s once-close relationship with the Taliban has turned into open confrontation along the volatile Durand Line. What was once a partnership built on shared interests has become a dangerous rivalry threatening to destabilize South Asia. The recent wave of cross-border strikes, refugee expulsions, and retaliatory attacks underscores how Islamabad’s long-standing reliance on militant proxies has boomeranged, eroding its leverage and exposing deep fractures in regional security.

What triggered the Pakistan-Taliban clashes?

In early October 2025, fierce clashes erupted along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border near the Torkham crossing, one of the busiest trade routes between the two nations. According to Pakistani officials, Taliban fighters and members of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) launched coordinated assaults on several outposts. In response, Pakistan’s army said it carried out “precision strikes” targeting Taliban camps and militant networks across the border.

Islamabad claims its actions were conducted in self-defense. “Pakistan, exercising its right of self-defense, not only effectively repulsed the assaults but inflicted heavy losses on Taliban forces,” the foreign ministry said. The military further announced that “multiple Taliban locations were destroyed,” claiming over 200 Taliban fighters were killed and 21 hostile positions temporarily captured.

Kabul, however, disputes the account. Afghan officials said 58 Pakistani soldiers were killed in retaliatory operations, accusing Islamabad of aggression and warning of “other options” if border tensions persist.

Why Pakistan’s proxy strategy has backfired

Pakistan’s involvement with the Taliban dates back to the 1990s, when Islamabad supported the group during the Afghan civil war and later recognized its regime. During the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, Pakistan provided refuge, logistics, and even medical aid to Taliban leaders, a policy aimed at maintaining strategic influence in Kabul.

That influence, however, evaporated when the Taliban regained power in 2021. As one analyst put it, “The Taliban no longer need Pakistan’s sanctuary or funding—they’ve outgrown their benefactor.”

The consequences have been severe:

• Loss of leverage: The Taliban’s independence has left Islamabad with little control over border dynamics.
• Rise of TTP: The Pakistani Taliban (TTP), long an offshoot of the Afghan Taliban, has regrouped and intensified attacks inside Pakistan since 2021.
• Domestic fallout: Pakistani security operations — such as Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fasaad — once weakened the TTP, but the group’s revival under Taliban protection has reignited internal insurgency.

A 2025 UN report said the TTP continues to receive “logistical and operational support” from elements within Afghanistan — a claim Kabul denies. Yet, the surge in violence inside Pakistan, including high-profile attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, suggests otherwise.

What Afghanistan says about Pakistan’s claims

Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, speaking during a visit to India, dismissed Pakistan’s accusations. “There is no presence of TTP in Afghanistan now,” he said. “They are Pakistani people from displaced areas and are allowed to live as refugees.”

Muttaqi framed the border violence as an internal Pakistani problem:

“The border is more than 2,400 km long — it could neither be controlled by Changez nor Angrez. Strength alone cannot control it. This fight is inside Pakistan.”

His comments reflected Kabul’s growing frustration with Islamabad’s cross-border strikes, which Afghanistan views as violations of sovereignty.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi issued a stark warning: “No provocation will be tolerated.” He claimed that retaliatory operations destroyed multiple Afghan border posts and militant camps, though these claims remain unverified by independent observers.

Refugee expulsions and humanitarian fallout

Amid the escalating military operations, Pakistan has also intensified its crackdown on undocumented Afghan refugees. Over one million Afghans have been expelled since late 2024, in what Islamabad calls a national security measure. The policy, however, has drawn condemnation from rights organizations and neighbouring countries, who warn it could fuel further instability inside Afghanistan.

The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and several Gulf nations, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have urged both sides to de-escalate and prioritize dialogue. “Peaceful coexistence, not confrontation, is essential for the stability of the region,” Riyadh said in a statement.

The Durand Line: A border still in dispute

At the heart of this conflict lies the Durand Line, the 2,600-kilometre frontier drawn by the British in 1893 to separate colonial India from Afghanistan. Kabul has never officially recognized it as an international boundary, and tensions over its legitimacy persist.

For Pakistan, securing this border is critical to preventing militant infiltration. For Afghanistan, it remains a symbol of sovereignty and resistance against foreign-imposed boundaries. This fundamental disagreement fuels recurring clashes, now compounded by mutual mistrust and militant activity.

Can Pakistan contain the fallout?

Islamabad’s recent military response reflects both desperation and declining influence. Decades of strategic depth policy, using militant groups to shape Afghanistan’s politics, have left Pakistan trapped in a conflict of its own making.

Analysts warn that sustained border violence could have several consequences:

• Worsening internal security: The TTP’s resurgence threatens Pakistan’s already fragile domestic stability.
• Regional isolation: Aggressive tactics risk alienating Gulf allies and international donors.
• Economic strain: Cross-border trade disruptions at key points like Torkham and Chaman could further weaken Pakistan’s struggling economy.

Unless both sides reestablish diplomatic communication and security coordination, the Durand Line risks becoming a perpetual war zone.

Why this matters beyond the border

The Pakistan-Taliban confrontation highlights the collapse of old regional assumptions. A Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, once seen as Islamabad’s buffer against Indian influence, now challenges Pakistan militarily and ideologically.

For Washington, Beijing, and Gulf capitals, the escalating crisis underscores the volatility of post-US withdrawal Afghanistan — and the limits of Pakistan’s capacity to manage its western frontier.

Ultimately, Islamabad’s decades-long proxy policy, once considered a cornerstone of its regional strategy, has turned inward, leaving it fighting former allies across a border that was never fully at peace.

TL;DR

Pakistan’s decades of backing the Taliban have come full circle. With the Taliban now in power and supporting anti-Pakistan militants, Islamabad faces a violent border crisis it once helped create. The Durand Line clashes show how proxy warfare has undermined Pakistan’s internal and regional security.