The Flydubai Omani pilot accused of attacking the captain of an Israel-bound passenger jet has triggered a second security investigation, this time into how he was allowed to operate a flight to Tel Aviv in the first place.

The incident occurred Wednesday aboard Flydubai Flight FZ1073, which was travelling from Dubai to Tel Aviv when Omani co-pilot Hamam al-Hammami allegedly attacked Indian captain Smit Machchhar in the cockpit. The aircraft entered a steep descent before the captain, other crew members and passengers intervened. The plane ultimately landed safely in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia.

The UAE has since opened an investigation into whether the incident constituted terrorist activity. Israeli authorities are separately examining the circumstances surrounding the flight and the suspect’s access to the cockpit.

But a report by Israel’s Channel 12 has raised a broader question: If Israel had restrictions concerning pilots from countries without diplomatic relations with Israel, why was an Omani national operating an Israel-bound commercial flight?

What happened on Flydubai Flight FZ1073?

Flight FZ1073 was flying from Dubai to Tel Aviv on September 30 when the situation inside the cockpit suddenly escalated.

According to Israeli government accounts and news reports, one pilot attacked the other as the aircraft approached Israel. The aircraft subsequently went into a steep descent. Machchhar, despite being injured, managed to fight back and open the cockpit door, allowing other people on board to intervene.

Passengers and additional pilots aboard the aircraft helped restrain the suspect and stabilize the aircraft. The flight was then diverted to Tabuk Airport in Saudi Arabia.

The incident also involved the transmission of the aviation emergency code 7500, which indicates an unlawful interference or hijacking situation.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the security services were conducting ongoing assessments following the incident. The UAE later characterised the episode as an attempted terrorist attack.

Who is the Omani co-pilot?

Multiple U.S. and international reports have identified the suspect as 29-year-old Hamam al-Hammami, an Omani citizen.

His background has become a central part of the investigation. ABC News, citing senior intelligence and law-enforcement officials, reported that al-Hammami was removed from flight training at Oman Air in 2024 after allegedly being found in possession of extremist material. The Wall Street Journal separately reported that he had previously been barred from flying in Oman because of concerns over radical ideological views.

CNN-linked reporting has also examined social media accounts and employment records associated with al-Hammami. Those reports say he subsequently worked outside Oman before joining Flydubai.

However, investigators have not publicly established all details of his employment history, what information was shared between employers or governments, or the precise motive behind the September 30 attack.

Those distinctions matter. Reports about his previous security concerns are based on sources familiar with the matter and remain part of an active investigation.

How did an Omani pilot end up on a flight to Israel?

This is the question now confronting Israeli aviation-security authorities.

Oman does not have diplomatic relations with Israel. Following the establishment of Israel-UAE diplomatic relations under the 2020 Abraham Accords, restrictions were reportedly put in place concerning the nationality of pilots operating flights into Israel.

Channel 12 reported that Israeli authorities had nevertheless allowed Omani pilots to fly into the country in recent years. Israeli media reports have variously described the number as around a dozen or as dozens, making the exact div something that should be independently confirmed before publication.

According to the Channel 12 report, Israeli security authorities largely relied on airlines to ensure that pilots from countries without diplomatic relations with Israel were not assigned to flights entering the country.

The report specifically alleged that Shin Bet did not independently verify the national origins of Flydubai’s pilots, beyond instructing the airline not to assign pilots from countries without diplomatic ties to Israel.

That distinction is important because it shifts the issue from a single pilot’s background to the architecture of the security system itself.

Was there actually a legal ban on Omani pilots?

This point requires particular care.

Some Israeli reports initially said that the Israel-UAE aviation arrangement required pilots operating flights between the two countries to come from states that had normalized relations with Israel. The Jerusalem Post cited an Israeli Transportation Ministry source describing an Omani pilot’s assignment as a breach of Flydubai’s operating agreement.

But a subsequent Jerusalem Post report, citing people familiar with the investigation, disputed that interpretation. Those sources said the bilateral aviation agreement itself did not stipulate that pilots had to be nationals of countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel.

That discrepancy should not be glossed over.

The underlying question is therefore not simply whether “Israel banned Omani pilots.” It is more precise to ask:

• What restrictions applied to foreign airline crews entering Israel?
• Were those restrictions legally binding, security directives or contractual requirements?
• Which agency was responsible for checking pilot nationality?
• Was Flydubai responsible for enforcing the restriction?
• Did Israeli authorities independently verify the airline’s crew lists?
• Did the Israeli government know that Omani nationals had previously operated flights into Tel Aviv?

The answers could determine whether the incident represents a failure to follow an established rule, a weakness in enforcement, or a misunderstanding over what the rule actually required.

Why did Shin Bet’s role come under scrutiny?

Israel’s aviation-security system involves multiple government bodies rather than a single checkpoint.

The Israeli Ministry of Transport says its security division is responsible for aviation security arrangements, including security screening of foreign flights entering Israel and issuing security guidelines to airlines. Its Aviation Security Operations Center coordinates security measures for aircraft arriving through Israeli airspace.

Channel 12’s reporting suggests that, in the Flydubai case, part of the crew-screening responsibility was effectively left to the airline.

That approach raises a classic aviation-security problem: the difference between identifying a passenger as a security threat and identifying a member of the flight crew as one.

A passenger does not have operational control over the aircraft. A pilot does.

The cockpit is also a uniquely sensitive environment. Since the September 11 attacks, aviation security has placed enormous emphasis on keeping unauthorized people out of the cockpit. The Flydubai incident highlights the other side of that equation: an authorized person already inside the cockpit can potentially become an insider threat.

Israel’s own watchdog had already warned about aviation-security gaps

The scrutiny is particularly significant because Israel’s State Comptroller had already raised concerns about the country’s civil aviation-security framework.

A May 2024 State Comptroller audit examined security involving international aviation departing Israel, Israeli aviation operating abroad, and foreign civilian aircraft entering Israeli airspace.

The report recommended that Israel’s National Security Council, working with the Transport Ministry, Civil Aviation Authority, Israel Security Agency and other bodies, conduct a comprehensive review of international civil aviation security. It also called for clearer arrangements concerning responsibility and resources across government agencies.

That report does not establish that the Flydubai incident was caused by the shortcomings it identified. The audit was completed before the current incident and covered a much broader aviation-security framework.

But its recommendations provide important context for the questions now being asked.

Consider adding an infographic here showing the agencies involved in Israeli aviation security and where responsibility for foreign airline crew screening sits.

The bigger problem: Insider threats are difficult to detect

The Flydubai incident illustrates why aviation security cannot focus exclusively on passengers, baggage and airport access.

A commercial pilot already has:

• Access to the cockpit.
• Knowledge of aircraft systems and emergency procedures.
• Authority during flight operations.
• Familiarity with security protocols.
• The ability to affect an aircraft without first breaching an airport checkpoint.

That makes pilot vetting fundamentally different from ordinary passenger screening.

It also creates a complicated international problem. A pilot may train or work for one airline, move to another country, and eventually join a third carrier. Information about disciplinary action, security concerns or employment restrictions may not automatically follow the individual across borders.

In al-Hammami’s case, reports that he had previously attracted security concerns while working for Oman Air have intensified questions about whether relevant information reached later employers or aviation-security authorities. The Wall Street Journal reported that it remained unclear whether Oman shared its concerns with other countries or airlines.

That is now likely to be a key part of the investigation.

What happens next?

The immediate investigation will likely have several separate tracks.

1. Investigators will establish the attacker’s motive

UAE authorities are investigating whether the incident involved terrorist activity and whether anyone else was involved. Israeli authorities are also investigating the circumstances surrounding the attack.

Although officials have described the incident in terrorism-related terms, the full motive and any possible outside direction still need to be established through the investigation.

2. Authorities will examine his employment history

Investigators will likely seek records from Oman Air, Royal Air Maroc and Flydubai to determine:

• Why al-Hammami was removed from flight training at Oman Air.
• What information was documented about the concerns.
• Whether he was formally prohibited from flying.
• Whether that information was shared with subsequent employers.
• What checks Flydubai conducted before hiring him.
• What checks were conducted before assigning him to an Israel-bound flight.

The distinction between being removed from a training program, being suspended from flying and being formally prohibited from aviation duties should also be established rather than treating those terms as interchangeable.

3. Israel will examine its own screening system

Israeli authorities will also have to determine how an Omani national was cleared to operate an Israel-bound commercial flight and whether the procedures in place were followed.

The investigation could ultimately result in changes to how airlines submit crew information, how pilot nationality is verified and how intelligence is shared between governments and carriers.

Why the Flydubai incident matters beyond one flight

The most consequential question raised by the incident may not be how a single pilot allegedly attacked his captain.

It is how several layers of aviation security interacted—or failed to interact—before the aircraft ever left Dubai.

If an airline is expected to enforce a nationality-based restriction, regulators need a reliable way to verify that the airline is complying. If a security agency has access to crew information but does not independently check it, responsibility becomes harder to trace when something goes wrong.

And if an individual previously identified as a security concern can move between airlines and jurisdictions without that information being communicated, the problem becomes international rather than local.

The Flydubai investigation therefore has the potential to become a test case for how modern aviation deals with insider threats.

For Israel, the issue is especially sensitive because foreign airlines connect the country to regions where diplomatic relationships vary widely. For airlines, the case raises questions about how deeply they should investigate the backgrounds of pilots who may operate flights into high-security destinations.

For passengers, the lesson is simpler: airport security does not end at the boarding gate.

The investigation will determine whether the Flydubai incident was enabled by a specific screening failure, a breakdown in information-sharing, an airline hiring decision, an unclear regulatory requirement—or a combination of several factors.

Until those findings are established, claims about exactly who failed and why should remain provisional.